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IAC-D-36
25 September 1951

LIKELIHOOD OF THE USSR DELIBERATELY INITIATING WAR DURING 1952

The attached proposal for an estimate on the above subject has been submitted by General Bolling for consideration of the IAC at its meeting on Thursday, 27 September 1951.

JAMES Q. REBER
Secretary
Intelligence Advisory Committee

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
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24 September 1951

MEMORANDUM FOR: CHAIRMAN, INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY COMMITTEE

SUBJECT: Likelihood of the U.S.S.R. Deliberately Initiating War During 1952

- The Intelligence Advisory Committee has variously estimated the likelihood of war, indicating that in the belief that the Soviet objective cannot be obtained without the involvement in a general war against the Western Powers, the Soviet rulers may decide deliberately to provoke such a war at a moment when, in their opinion, the strength of the Soviet Union vis-a-vis the Western Powers is at its maximum. It has been estimated that such a period exists now and will extend from the present through 1954, with its peak at about half-way, i.e., 1952.
- 2. We are approaching this critical period, and recent events unfavorable to the U.S.S.R. may confront its leaders with the necessity of reevaluating the Soviet position.
- 3. It is therefore requested that the IAC prepare an estimate of the "Likelihood of the U.S.S.R. Deliberately Initiating War During 1952." The scope of such an estimate should include, but not be limited to, the factors shown in the attached draft, "Proposed Terms of Reference," (Tab "A").

/s/ A. R. BOLLING

1 Incl Proposed Terms of Reference - Tab "A"

A. R. BOLLING Major General, GSC A. C. of S., G-2

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TAB "A"

PROPOSED TERMS OF REFERENCE

The Problem:

1. To estimate the likelihood of the USSR deliberately initiating war during 1952.

Scope:

- 2. Soviet strategic, political and economic objectives.
- 3. Soviet courses of action to date to accomplish her strategic, political and economic objectives.
 - 4. Soviet successes
 - a. Political consolidation of European Satellites
 - b. Conversion of Satellite industry to meet Soviet requirements
 - c. Rearmament and increase of strength of Satellite armed forces
 - d. Soviet industrial development
 - e. Soviet technological advancement
 - f. Other
 - 5. Soviet failures
 - a. Failure at CFM agenda conference at Paris, Spring of 1951
 - b. Communist failure to drive UN forces from Korea
 - c. Possible unsatisfactory developments at the Kaesong conference
 - d. Failure at San Francisco conference
 - e. Failure to halt Western rearmament including West German

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- f. Failure to create dissention in NATO.
- g. Failure of VM to drive French from Indochina
- h. Continued Yugoslav intransigence
- i. Failure to block initial steps toward Japanese rearma-
- j. Behavior of delegates at the youth conference in Berlin, 1951
- k. Other

*

- 6. Factors which might cause Soviets deliberately to go to war:
 - a. Increasing Western rearmament including West German
 - b. Increase in U. S. atomic stockpile from one of "scarcity" to one of "plenty"
 - c. Situation in Korea
 - d. Japanese rearmament
 - e. Progress towards U.S. industrial mobilization
 - f. Chinese Communist military demands
 - g. Inclusion of Greece, Turkey, in NATO
 - h. U.S. Spanish cooperation arrangement
 - i. Military aid to Yugoslavia
 - j. Other
 - 7. Probable Soviet Courses of action:
 - a. ---
 - ъ. ---
 - c. ---

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- x. Most likely course of action in 1952
- 8. Conclusion: